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United Nations Sanctions after Iraq:
Looking Back to See Ahead
Christopher C. Joyner*

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 22, 2003, the United Nations Security Council voted 14-0 to adopt
a US-sponsored resolution advocating the formal lifting of UN economic
sanctions against Iraq. These measures, imposed with US sponsorship when Iraq
invaded Kuwait in August 1990, placed restrictions on Iraq's oil imports and put
the expenditure of its oil revenues under UN control. Removal of these sanction
measures was conditioned on the destruction by Saddam Hussein of all weapons
of mass destruction, a situation rendered moot by the US military victory and
occupation of Iraq during March-April 2003. The effort by the Bush
administration to end the UN sanctions regime was intended to allow Iraq's
extensive oil resources to be used to foster and facilitate that country's
economic, political, and social recovery from the tyrannical regime of Saddam
Hussein, as well as to finance reconstruction from the 2003 Iraqi war.'
Professor of International Law, Department of Government and Edmund A. Walsh School
of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; Director, Institute of International Law and
Politics, Georgetown University; PhD 1977, University of Virginia (Foreign Affairs), MA
1973, Florida State University (Government); MA 1972, Florida State University
(International Relations); BA 1970, Florida State University (International Relations/
History).
Security Council Res No 1483, UN Doc No S/RES/1483 (2003). This resolution transfers
legal control over Iraq's oil industry from the United Nations and Iraq to the United States
and its allies. The proceeds will be used to finance Iraq's reconstruction, the costs of
government administration, and completion of Iraq's disarmament. Oil revenues will be
deposited in the Development Fund of Iraq and will be immune from claims by foreign
creditors. The resolution also extends political legitimacy to US rule by providing for a USadministered Coalition Provisional Authority that will direct international reconstruction aid
from international financial institutions and other governments. The United Nations is given
a formal role through the Secretary General's appointment of a special representative to
supervise UN relief and reconstruction efforts and participate in the political transition to an
Iraqi government. Syria, the only Arab member on the Security Council this session, did not
vote. See Colum Lynch, Securiby Council Ends Iraq Sanctions; U.S. Given Control over Economy,
Wash Post A16 (May 23, 2003); Colum Lynch, U.S. to Propose Broader Control of Iraqi Oil,
Funds; Draft Resolution Also Would End Decade of U.N. Trade Sanctions, Wash Post Al (May 9,
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The UN's thirteen-year-old sanctions regime against Iraq marked a
watershed development in the application of economic coercion by the United
Nations. These measures-the most extensive and most prolonged ever applied
by the United Nations-became the most economically devastating on their
targeted citizenry, as well as the most politically controversial among human
rights advocates. Given these circumstances, it is useful to assess both the
impact of these sanctions on the economy and society of Iraq and the lawfulness
of Security Council sanctions application in light of international humanitarian
law. From this analysis we should be able to gauge what implications flow from
the Iraq sanctions operation for future UN sanctions as instruments of UN
peacekeeping. To these ends, Part II of this article briefly examines the nature,
means, and processes of UN sanctions operations. The Iraqi sanctions
experience is then assessed in Part III, to determine its economic and social
impacts on the people and government of Iraq. Part IV critically distills and
evaluates the lessons to be drawn from the Iraqi sanctions experience. Finally,
Part V proffers some conclusions for critical reflection.
II. UN SANCTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Sanctions adopted by the Security Council are instruments of international
politics. They are neither trade policies nor transnational business practices. UN
sanctions entail a combination of mandatory boycotts where states refuse to buy
goods from the target state and embargoes where states refuse to sell goods to a
target state. The Security Council directs sanctions operations through special
sanctions committees; 2 the entire UN membership imposes sanctions against a
target government. Such multilateral economic injunctions operate between
states, rather than between individuals, and they are ordered by the UN Security
Council against the will of the target state. The ambition of such sanctions is
unmistakable: to prevent the exchange of goods, services, or persons across
national borders, thereby isolating the target state from international commerce.
While the word "sanction" is sometimes applied to various commercial
policies between states, UN sanctions differ from standard trade policies in that
they amount to forceful measures that are internationally legitimized. Unlike
diplomatic negotiations, Security Council-mandated measures against states are

2

2003); Mike Allen, Bush Urges U.N. to Lift Sanctions on Iraq; New Way of War Will Help U.S.
Target Threats, President Warns, Wash Post Al (Apr 17, 2003); Colum Lynch and Robert J.
McCartney, Lifting of Sanctions Linked to U.N. Role; War Opponents Place Conditions on U.S.
Request for Iraq Aid, Wash Post Al (Apr 18, 2003); John Mintz and Colum Lynch, Some Iraq
Sanctions to Be Eased by U.S.; Lifting U.N. Sanctions Also Backed, Wash Post A1 (May 8, 2003).
See Security Coundl Sanctions Committees: An Overview, available online at <http://www.un.org/
Docs/sc/committees/1NTRO.htm> (visited Sept 17, 2003).
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not left to voluntary or consensual agreement among member states. A
declaration by the Security Council of a sanctions decision legally obligates all
member governments of the UN to impose and enforce the stipulated restrictive
measures against a targeted state. In this regard, UN sanctions more closely
resemble mandatory economic coercion than tools of international trade or
diplomacy. Moreover, these sanctions operations should not be confused with
international trade wars, in which nations raise or lower prices for exchanged
goods in reprisal to punish an adversary. Nor are the sanctions a form of
economic warfare, wherein the entire economy or designated economic sectors
of a state are targeted for destruction in order to achieve military aims. Put
tersely, UN sanctions are coercive measures, which are intended to convince or
compel a state to desist from engaging in acts violating international law. They
are penalties imposed by the Security Council as the designated consequence of
some state's failure to observe international standards or legal obligations. UN
sanctions thus entail a designated economic means to a preferred end, namely
the deviant state's return to acceptable behavior.
B. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
The lawful authority and political legitimacy of contemporary economic
sanctions are strengthened when they are formally institutionalized through the
framework of the UN. When framing the UN Charter, its founders paid special
attention to the use of economic sanctions as part of a more sophisticated
system of collective security. The aims of the organization, detailed in Articles 1
and 2, stress the maintenance of international peace and security and recognize
the sovereign equality of member states. 3 In Chapter VI, the Charter conveys the
obligation to settle disputes peacefully and outlines appropriate procedures to
that end.
Article 1 of the United Nations Charter provides in relevant part that:
The purposes of the United Nations are:
1.

To maintain international peace and security and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace ....

Article 2 provides in relevant part that:
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1.

The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members.

5.

All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any
action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain
from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is
taking preventive or enforcement action.

Chicago Journalof InternationalLaw

Article 24 delegates chief responsibility for maintaining international peace
and security to the Security Council.4 Fifteen members comprise this organ, of
which five are permanent members with a veto power (namely China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and ten other rotating
members. Decisions of the Security Council bind member states of the
UN and
5
carry the full weight of international law in accordance with Article 25.
Within the UN Charter, the legal teeth of sanctions are rooted in Chapter
VII, Articles 39 through 42. The Security Council, by virtue of Article 39,
"determine[s] the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression" and may enact provisional measures under Article 40 while
examining the situation further and before implementing more severe actions.
Article 41 authorizes the Council to use economic sanctions, expressed as the
"complete or partial interruption of economic relations," and to use similar
measures "not involving the use of armed force." 6 Should provisional measures
prove ineffective, the Security Council may decide upon appropriate steps under
Article 41 to give effect to its decisions. Article 42 also allows the Security
Council to authorize "such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary"
that could be carried out by 7member forces should measures taken under Article
41 prove to be unsuccessful.

Article 24 provides in relevant part that:
1.

6

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations,
its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts
on their behalf.
In full, Article 25 provides: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." Due to the
political paralysis of the Security Council during the Cold War, however, the General
Assembly occasionally attempted to address threats to the peace and to enact sanctions
through passage of a resolution. Nevertheless, such resolutions were strictly
recommendations and did not obligate members in the manner of a Security Council
decision.
In full, Article 41 provides:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may
include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea,
air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42 provides in full that:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.
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C. UN SANCTIONS CASES
The application of UN economic sanctions is largely a post-Cold War
phenomenon. The UN imposed such measures only twice before 1990;
however, in the wake of the Cold War, Security Council policymakers viewed
economic sanctions as more humane than military action, while still a punitive
instrument of international relations. Throughout its history, the Security
Council invoked collective sanctions as enforcement actions under Chapter VII
only in fourteen cases: Afghanistan (1999- );8 Angola (1993- );9 Ethiopia and
Eritrea (2000-2001);10 Haiti (1993-1994);"1
Iraj (1990-2003); 12 Liberia
(1992- ); 3 Libya (1992-2003);14 Rwanda (1993- );5 Sierra Leone (1997- );16
Somalia (1992- );f7 South Africa (1977-1994); 18 Southern Rhodesia (19661979); 19 Sudan (1996-2001); 20 and the former Yugoslavia (1992-2002). 21 As
events and circumstances have changed, sanctions were fully lifted against
Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Haiti, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Sudan,
and the former Yugoslavia. In the case of Libya, they are only suspended. UN
sanctions remain actively in force against Afghanistan, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, and Somalia.
8
9

10
1I
12

13

14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21

Security Council Res No 1267, UN Doc No S/RES/1267 (1999).
Security Council Res No 864, UN Doc No S/RES/864 (1993).
Security Council Res No 1298, UN Doc No S/RES/1298 (2000).
Security Council Res No 841, UN Doc No S/RES/841 (1993).
On August 1, 1990, Iraqi tanks and troops invaded and quickly conquered its small but oilrich neighbor, Kuwait. In response to the urgent request of Kuwait, the Security Council
convened on August 2, 1990, to consider the invasion of that state by Iraqi forces. The
Council adopted Resolution 660 on August 2, citing its authority under Articles 39 and 40
and announcing its determination that a breach of international peace had occurred. Security
Council Res No 660, UN Doc No S/RES/660 (1990). This resolution condemned the
invasion, called for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, and announced
that the Council would meet as necessary to ensure compliance with that mandate. This
action by the Security Council initiated a protracted series of at least sixteen resolutions
aimed at condemning various policies and activities by Iraq and at taking measures to compel
that government to cease, desist, and amend its transgressions against Kuwait, and later,
human rights abuses against its own citizens. Taken in tandem, these Security Council
resolutions established the legal mandate through which international economic sanctions
were prosecuted against Iraq. The Council subsequently adopted Resolution 661 (imposing
comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait under Chapter VII of the
Charter). See Security Council Res No 661, UN Doc No S/RES/661 (1990).
Security Council Res No 788, UN Doc No S/RES/788 (1992).
Security Council Res No 748, UN Doc No S/RES/748 (1992).
Security Council Res No 918, UN Doc No S/RES/918 (1994).
Security Council Res No 1132, UN Doc No S/RES/1132 (1997).
Security Council Res No 733, UN Doc No S/RES/733 (1992).
Security Council Res No 418, UN Doc No S/RES/418 (1977).
Security Council Res No 221, UN Doc No S/RES/221 (1966).
Security Council Res No 1054, UN Doc No S/RES/1054 (1996).
Security Council Res No 713, UN Doc No S/RES/713 (1991).
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III. UN SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ
The general theory underpinning UN sanctions against Iraq is
uncomplicated
and straightforward. The Security Council
mandated
international measures of denial and deprivation to put economic pressure on
the population of Iraq because it was claimed that their government possessed
weapons of mass destruction. Such exploitation of widespread civilian suffering
is done to inflict political pressure on the government. That is, feeling
increasingly deprived and angry, the people in Iraq will pressure their rulers to
change the objectionable policy. If the policy is not changed, then the people are
expected to rise up and throw out their government. Notwithstanding its ready
appeal-victory for the UN in securing policy change in Iraq without engaging
in external violence, armed conflict, or external military intervention-such a
scenario proved overly simplistic. It cannot succeed in a state controlled by fear
and security police, as was the case under Saddam Hussein's regime.
The sanctions instigated on Iraq were the strongest, most salient UN
embargo actions ever imposed against a state. UN sanctions against Iraq were
motivated by Saddam Hussein's military invasion and unlawful occupation of
Kuwait in August 1990. On August 6, 1990, the UN Security Council imposed,
by Resolution 661, comprehensive sanctions against Iraq. 22 The sanctions
operation against Iraq functioned in a deliberately premeditated and coordinated
manner. That same resolution created a special Sanctions Committee, comprised
of all fifteen members of the Security Council. The principal purpose of this
body was to direct and coordinate the sanctions regime, as authorized by the
Security Council. Since 1990, the Security Council has been persistently seized

with adapting the sanctions regime to changing circumstances in Iraq2 and has
adopted no less than sixty-five legally binding resolutions on the matter.
The Multinational (Maritime) Interception Force militarily enforces the
Security Council's sanctions, while private companies and various UN agencies
administratively enforce the sanctions. 24 The sanctions against Iraq were
22

23

24

Security Council Res No 661, UN Doc No S/RES/661 (cited in note 12).
Spanning thirteen years, the Security Council adopted at least sixty-five measures that directly
relate to the sanctions operation against Iraq. See Securi Council Resolutions Concerning the
Situation betyeen Iraq and Kinwait, available online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/
committees/IraqKuwait/lraqResolutionsEng.htm> (visited Sept 17, 2003). These measures
comprehensively addressed what goods the sanctions prohibited, repeatedly extended the
Oil-for-Food program, and made frequent alterations to the mechanics of the sanctions.
One of these private enforcement agencies is Cotecna Inspection SA. Incorporated
in 1975
in Geneva, Cotecna initially specialized in the inspection of a variety of goods on behalf of
private traders and governmental entities involved in international trade. Since then, Cotecna
has specialized in government-mandated services that have aimed to reduce the appeal for
importers of evading foreign exchange and increasing customs revenue. Worldwide, Cotecna
operates in partnership with OMIC International Ltd, a Japan-based inspection company.
Currently, the Cotecna Group has a combined workforce of about 4,000 employees in 150
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economic in kind (insofar as they interdict the free exchange of goods) and
comprehensive in scope (insofar as the entirety of imports to and exports from
Iraq fall within its purview). Irrespective of the range of humanitarian loopholes
created within the UN sanctions action against Iraq, complete fiscal and
mechanism remains with that
administrative control over Iraq's import/export
2
5
Committee.
Sanctions
Council
Security
Of all United Nations sanctions operations, the one imposed against Iraq
proved to be the most economically destructive and devastating on its targeted
society. The UN sanctions regime for Iraq evolved in a resolute, premeditated
fashion through four prominent periods. The first period, which extended from
August 1990 until April 1997, entailed a phase during which all Iraqi imports,
and medicine, and all Iraqi exports were banned from international
save food 26
commerce. During this initial period the UN sanctions operation inflicted the
greatest devastation on the Iraqi people at large. A shift in the sanctions
operation appeared in May 1996, when the Government of Iraq and the Security
Council agreed on the Oil-for-Food program ("OFF"). This program began
functioning in April 1997 and marked the second major period in the Iraqi
sanctions action. It not only permitted the Security Council to supervise Iraq's
importation of various humanitarian goods but also required that body's
certification of payment for those imports from an escrow account containing
Iraqi oil revenues administered by the Security Council. The Oil-for-Food
program effectively barred all civilian items with potential military use, that is,
"dual-use" items. 27 Nonetheless, as worldwide criticism against the sanctions
offices located in 100 states and holds 10 contracts for Preshipment Inspection schemes. See
(under "Company History" link)
<http://www.cotecna.com/corp/corp-aboutUs.asp>
(visited Sept 4, 2003). See also United Nations, Memorandum of Understanding between the

Secretariatof the United Nations and the Government of Iraq on the Implementation of Securio Council
25

26

Resolution 986 (1995), UN Doc No S/1996/356 (1996) (regulating border inspections).
Security Council Res No 661, UN Doc No S/RES/661 (cited in note 12) (establishing the
Iraqi sanctions regime, also known as the 661 Committee, which is the final arbiter for all
matters related to Iraq sanctions). The members of the 661 Committee are the fifteen
Security Council members. United Nations, Security Council Members, available online at
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscmembers.html> (visited Sept 17, 2003).
Security Council Res No 666, UN Doc No S/RES/666 (1990) (exempting medicines and
foodstuffs from sanctions and allowing Iraqis to contract for them and other nationals to
provide them). Resolution 666 charged the Security Council with furnishing humanitarian
relief for the Iraqi people:
[I]f the Committee, after receiving the reports from the Secretary-General,
determines that circumstances have arisen in which there is an urgent
humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve
human suffering, it will report promptly to the Council its decision as to how
such need should be met.

27

Id 5.
Security Council Res No 1051, UN Doc No S/RES/1051 (1996). The so-called 1051 list
contained long lists of dual-use items in the chemical, biological, ballistic, and nuclear field,
drawn up by experts from UN Special Commission ("UNSCOM"). Items on this list could
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mounted throughout the 1990s, new strategies for applying UN sanctions were
devised. Consequently, a change in the nature of the Iraqi anctions operation
became driven by the notion of "smart" sanctions. 28 These "smart sanctions"
targeted military-related facets of the regime itself, instead of Iraq's economy at
large. The intent here was to spare the general population the economic
deprivation caused by the sanctions. Contrary to its purported idea, however,
scant "smart" targeting occurred. From December 2000 to February 2001,
professed "fast-track" lists were drawn up that guaranteed automatic approval
for certain items for housing, education, electricity, water, and sanitation. In June
2001, the Security Council failed to adopt a British-American proposal for
implementing UN "smart sanctions. ' 29 Nevertheless, following al Qaeda's
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, resistance to smart sanctions
diminished. In its Resolution 1382 in November 2001, the Security Council
adopted a long list of forbidden items, as well as a draft recommendation for an
even longer list. This also marked the beginning of the third period of Iraqi
sanctions. In May 2002, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1409, which
fundamentally reshaped the character of UN sanctions against Iraq.3 1 This
resolution lifted restrictions on shipping civilian goods to Iraq. While the arms
embargo remained in place, a new technology transfer control system was
established. The focus of sanctions thus moved from prohibiting civilian trade

28

be exported to Iraq provided there was notification of such items and their end-use was
monitored by UN agents in Iraq. See generally United Nations, Letter Dated 3 Ma 2002from
the Depuo PermanentRepresentative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to
the President of the Secarity Council, UN Doc No S/2002/515, Annex (Goods Review Ust)
(2002), available online at <http://www.norway-un.org/archive/attachments/01/07/
Goods05l.pdf' (visited Sept 17, 2003) and discussion in the text at notes 56-63.
If the UN were to resort to "smart sanctions," sanctions would be focused on weapons and

30

military-related goods rather than general trade. A system of smart sanctions depends on
continued UN control of Iraqi oil revenues and strict monitoring of military-related imports.
Trade in nonmilitary, non-dual-use commercial goods would be legalized, while restrictions
on government finances and weapons-related imports would be tightened. Purportedly, such
a system would put serious limitations on Iraq's ability to redevelop its conventional weapons
capacity, as well as weapons of mass destruction, while relaxing unnecessary restrictions on
Iraqi civilians and nonmilitary commercial trade.
In this case of "smart sanctions," Russia threatened to veto the proposals, preferring instead
to lift economic sanctions and maintain only arms-related sanctions. France introduced its
own draft, which was much more lenient on major issues, like foreign investment and travel
restrictions. In a draft to the Security Council Working Group on Sanctions, France also
suggested that the continuation of sanctions, not the lifting, needed Security Council
approval with significant implications for the permanent five members with veto power.
Agreement seemed unlikely until after September 11th. See Campaign against Sanctions on
Iraq, ll7orking Group on Sanctions-Draft Report, 14 Feb 2001, available online at
<http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scwgs140201.html> (visited Sept 17, 2003).
Security Council Res No 1382, UN Doc No S/RES/1382 (2001) (enumerating the extensive

31

Proposed Goods Review List in Annex 1).
See Security Council Res No 1409, UN Doc No S/RES/1409 (2002).

29
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to banning imports into Iraq of weapons and military-related materiel. The
resolution approved a Goods Review List ("GRL") of specified dual-use items
that would be subject to UN review and approval, as detailed in an annex of
procedures appended to the resolution. These review procedures would apply
only to designated dual-use technologies and goods with potential weapons
application. All other civilian goods would be allowed to flow freely into Iraq
without monitoring or preliminary approval. Notwithstanding such intentions,
events overtook the ability of the Iraq Sanctions Committee to assess how
effectively these UN "smart sanctions" functioned. Less than a year after the
GRL was adopted, the United States invaded and seized control of Iraq. Thus,
the third period of sanctions against Iraq ended with the removal of Saddam
Hussein's regime in April 2003. The fourth period involved efforts by the
United States and United Kingdom in the Security Council to lift the sanctions.
Removal of sanctions allowed the United States to control Iraqi oil sales and
production and to facilitate the Iraqi people's ability to reconstruct their society
in the aftermath of the US military operation that removed Saddam Hussein's
regime. UN sanctions were lifted on May 22, 2003, by Security Council
resolution 1483.32
There is little doubt that persistent UN sanctions against Iraq hamstrung
ability
of Saddam Hussein's regime to revive its military and weapons
the
capability. Although sanctions were less than successful in convincing the
Baghdad government to comply with mandates in the Security Council's
resolutions, they were effective as a means of military containment. Sanctions
precluded the Baghdad government from securing access to its vast oil revenues.
The UN, not Saddam Hussein's government, controlled nearly all the revenues
derived from Iraqi oil sales. Since sanctions began in August 1990, estimates
suggest that Iraq was denied more than $150 billion in oil revenues. 3 3 This denial
precluded Iraq from purchasing sufficient weapons and military-related
equipment to rebuild and modernize its armed forces. The aggregate deficit in
arms imports for Iraq since 1990 is believed to exceed $50 billion. 34 This
amount is what Iraq likely would have spent on imported weapons if it had
continued to buy arms as it did during the 1980s. Although Iraq gained some
unrestricted revenue through smuggling and kickbacks (estimated at between

32

Security Council Res No 1483, UN Doc No S/RES/1483 (cited in note 1).

33

See Meghan L. O'Sullivan, Iraq: Time for a Modified Approach, Brookings Inst Poly Brief 71 at 3
(Feb 2001), available online at <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb71.htm>
(visited Sept 17, 2003).
See Anthony H. Cordesman, Militay Expenditures and Arms Transfers in the Middle East 79
online at
Studies 2001), available
International
(Center for Strategic and
<http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/milexpenditurearmstransfer.pdf> (visited Sept 4, 2003).

34
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$1.5 and $3 billion annually), 35 this income is not sufficient to fund a large-scale
military development program. Consequently, Iraq's ability to produce weapons
of mass destruction and develop the means to deliver them was severely
impaired. Notwithstanding this positive security outcome, the fact persists that
UN sanctions inflicted pervasive, devastating impacts on Iraqi society, as harsh
social, economic, and physiological deprivations and dislocations plagued the
country, especially harming innocent civilians.
Following the initial imposition of sanctions against Iraq, many
commentators believed that such comprehensive economic measures were
innovative and nonviolent tools of international coercion. Sanctions supplied an
ethical foreign policy instrument for pressuring Baghdad's government short of
military conflict. Throughout the 1990s, however, UN sanctions began to bite
deeper into Iraqi society. It became apparent that large numbers of innocent
civilians in Iraq were suffering from acute deprivations of food and medicine, as
well as from the wholesale disruption of the national economy. This situation
produced pervasive impoverishment throughout Iraq's society, decreased the
quality of water treatment and utilities, and contributed to the general
deterioration of the public health infrastructure. In short, measures that initially
were intended as a means to apply nonviolent economic pressure on the Iraqi
government deteriorated into an aggravated humanitarian crisis for nearly all of
Iraq's society.
Human rights groups alleged throughout the 1990s that the human cost of
UN sanctions against Iraq was excruciatingly excessive. Considerable merit
resides in these accusations, as the sanctions impacted surprisingly hard on the
civilian population. Various independent studies done during the mid-1990s
suggest that UN sanctions perpetrated widespread and severe human
deprivations that most severely affected the very groups most at risk in Iraqi
society. Throughout the early 1990s, food shortages in Iraq became acute, which
prompted 36numerous
independent and UN-affiliated studies and reports to assess
.
the crisis. For example, in 1996, the Food and Agriculture Organization
("FAO") published a study that documented the lack of available foodstuffs and

35

36

See Raad Alkadari, The Iraqi Klondike: Oil and Regional Trade, 220 Middle E Rep at 5 (Fall
2001), available online at <http//www.merip.org/mer/mer220/220_alkadiri.html> (visited
Sept 17, 2003); Carola Hoyos, Oil Smugglers Keep Cash Flowing Back to Saddam; Carola Hoyos
Examines a Case Study of How Companies, Witingly or Unwittingy, Are Flouting UN Sanctions against
Iraq, Fin Times 9 (an 17, 2002).
See, for example, UNICEF, The Status of Children and Women in Iraq (1995), available online at
<http://leb.net/beome/iraq/unicef.html> (visited Sept 17, 2003); UNHCR, Humanitarian
Situation in Iraq: Sub-Co,mmission Decision 1997/119, UN Doc E/CN.4/SUB.2/EC/
1997/119(1997); Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO Warns of Danger to Near East if
Outbreak of Animal Diseases in Iraq Is Not Contained-Situation Could Threaten Near East Food

Securioy (Feb 10, 1999),

available online at <http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/OIS/

PRESSNE/PRESSENG/1999/pren9904.htm> (visited Sept 17, 2003).
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the impact on Iraqi children. The report reached the startling conclusions that
the infant mortality rate for Iraq had doubled during the period of the sanctions
and that the mortality rate of children under five years old had increased sixfold
since 1990. 3 7 Another study in 1996 by the Center for Economic and Social
Rights ("CESR")
calculated that at least 567,000 children died as a result of
38
sanctions. In 1997, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights released a report that criticized the Security Council for not adequately
taking into account its responsibilities under economic, social, and cultural rights
law. From 1990 to 1997, the report alleges that UN sanctions "often cause[d]
significant disruption in the distribution of food, pharmaceuticals and sanitation
supplies, jeopardize[d] the quality of food and the availability of clean drinking
water, severely interfere[d] with the functioning
of basic health and education
39
work."
to
right
the
undermine[d]
systems, and
The sanctions in Iraq hit hardest on those groups most vulnerable, namely
children, women, the sick, and the poorer sectors of society. Iraq's economy
during the 1990s fell into shambles as stagnation set in and became complicated
by conditions of higher unemployment, increased inflation and shortages of
food, medicine, and consumer goods. A Security Council-appointed panel
summarized in 1999 the health and sanitation situation as follows:
In marked contrast to the prevailing situation prior to the events of 19901991, the infant mortality rates in Iraq today are among the highest in the
world, low infant birth weight affects at least 23 percent of all births,
chronic malnutrition affects every fourth child under five years of age, only
41 percent of the population have regular access to clean water, [and] 83
percent of all schools need substantial repairs. The [International
Committee of the Red Cross] states that the Iraqi health-care system is
today in a decrepit state. [UN Development Programme] calculates that it
37

38

39

40

World Health Organization, Health Conditionsof the Population in Iraq since the Gulf Crisis 5 4 at 7
(Mar
1996),
available
online
at
<http://www.who.int/disasters/resource/pubs/
000396.html> (visited Sept 17, 2003).
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(relying on a FAO report of 1995 published by CESR). These figures, however, are disputed.
Some scholars prefer the narrower criteria applied by Richard Garfield of Columbia
University. Garfield tabulated that the rise in the mortality rate accounted for between a
minimum of 100,000 and a more likely estimate of 227,000 excess deaths among under-five
age children from August 1991 through March 1998. See Richard Garfield, Morbidity and
Mortality among Iraqi Children: Summary of GeneralFindings, Fourth Freedom F (1999), available
online at <http://fourthfreedom.org/php/t-si-index.php> (visited Sept 17, 2003).
United Nations, The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc
E/C.12/1997/8, general comment 8 at 3 (1997).
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would take 7 billion4VS dollars to rehabilitate the power sector country-wide
to its 1990 capacity.
It remains indisputable that among the highest costs of sanctions against Iraq
was the crippling damage they inflicted on that country 's human resources.
During the 1990s, Iraq's educational system collapsed. Iraq's literacy rate
plunged from 89 percent in 1987 to 57 percent in 1997. 4 Emigration from Iraq
rose sharply, carrying with it a severe "brain drain" of Iraq's best and brightest
workers. Perhaps most telling about the broad impact of the sanctions is Iraq's
human development index. For 130 countries, this calculation measures the
adult literacy rate, life expectancy, and GDP per capita as a standard
approximation of living standards. For Iraq, this indicator
tumbled from 55th
45
1999.
in
125th
to
and
1995,
in
106th
to
1990,
place in
The second period of the UN sanctions against Iraq was marked by the
onset of the OFF program. By 1995, worldwide political support for Iraqi
sanctions had dramatically diminished and widespread cheating by neighboring
states had become more evident. As proposed, OFF permitted Iraq to export its
oil on a regulated basis, under UN supervision, and to use revenues from oil
sales to purchase humanitarian supplies. In part, the need for this program was
triggered by the Security Council's realization that the humanitarian crisis in Iraq
was genuine and acute. Altruism, however, was not the main motive for the
Security Council's revision of its earlier plan on humanitarian trade. Through the
OFF program, it was believed that wider international political support for the
sanctions operation could be revived, and greater pressure then brought to bear
on Saddam Hussein's government. In broad scope, this Security
Council-directed program relieved the worst of the food shortages as supplies
began to arrive in Iraq in mid-1997. The Security Council passed its Resolution
986 as a "temporary" measure on April 14, 1995, imposing a restrictive cap on
oil sales. 46 The government of Iraq agreed to the Security Council conditions for
this program a year later, and OFF began operation in late 1996.
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United Nations, Report of the Second Panel EstablishedPursuantto the Note by the President of the
Security Council of 30 Januay 1999 (S/1999/100), Concerning the Current HumanitarianSituation in
Iraq, UN Doc No S/1999/356, Annex II at 43 (1999).
See UNESCO, Great Uniy, Great Diversity, available online at <http://www.unesco.org/
education/efa/wef_2000/ press-kit/arab.pdf> (visited Sept 18, 2003).
See United Nations Development Programme, UNDP in Iraq, available online at
<www.iq.undp.org/current-settings.htm> (visited Sept 17, 2003).
See Andrew Chang, The Iraqi Brain Drain: ProfessionalsLeaving Home at High Rate, Threatening
Iraq's Future, ABC News (Feb 16, 2001), available online at <http://abcnews.go.com/
sections/world/DailyNews/iraq010217_braindrain.html> (visited Sept 18, 2003).
See Nadia Hijab, Counting the Cost of U.N. Sanctions: People Eke Out a Living in Baghdad, a City of
Power Cuts, Sweltering Heat and Spiralling Poverty, Guardian (London) 18 (Mar 8, 2000).
Security Council Res No 986, UN Doc No S/RES/986 (1995).
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Under Resolution 986, the Council initially permitted Iraq to sell $2 billion
worth of oil every six months, not including the dedication of 30 percent from
all oil sales to finance the Compensation Fund for Kuwait.4 7 In addition,
deductions amounting to 4 percent would cover the UN Office of the Iraqi
Programme ("OIP"), the arms inspection units (through the UN Special
Commission ("UNSCOM") and the International Atomic Energy Authority
("IAEA")), and fees. 4 8 The government of Iraq finally accepted the resolution in
May 1996, and oil started flowing in December 1996. Because of procurement
and shipping lags, the UN humanitarian supplies did not arrive in Iraq until
April 1997.
With the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1330 in December
2000, 49 72 percent of the total export revenues were allocated towards
humanitarian needs nationwide.5 0 The balance went to Gulf War reparations
through a Compensation Fund (25 percent since December 2000), UN
administrative and operational costs for the program (2.2 percent) and costs for
administration of the weapons inspection (that is, the UN Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission ("UNMOVIC")) (0.8 percent).
"Almost $28 billion worth of humanitarian supplies and equipment have been
delivered to Iraq under the Oil-for-Food Programme, including $1.6 billion
worth of oil industry spare parts and equipment. An additional $10 billion worth
of supplies are currently in the production and delivery pipeline."5 2 As of
September 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraqi experts, and the UN
53
have prioritized more than $6.3 billion dollars in contracts.
From December 10, 1996, through March 21, 2003, about 5.6 billion
barrels of Iraq4 oil valued approximately $64 billion were exported under the
OFF program. This amount looks impressive. However, far less value in goods
has arrived in Iraq. After the 28 percent deductions for war reparations, UN
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Security Council Res No 1330, UN Doc No S/RES/1330 at 2 (2000).
Of the remaining 66 percent, the resolution earmarked 13 percent for the three autonomous
Kurdish northern governorates of Dahuk, Arbil, and Suleymaniyah, where a UN inter-agency
group would run the humanitarian program, and the remaining 53 percent for the balance of
the country where the government would be in charge of distribution. UN Office of the Iraq
Programme-Oil-for-Food, In Brief (July 2003), available online at <http://www.un.org/
Depts/oip/background/inbrief.html> (visited Sept 18, 2003).
Security Council Res No 1330, UN Doc No S/RES/1330 (cited in note 47).
UN Office of the Iraq Programme-Oil-for-Food, Iraq Oil Sales Fund HumanitarianAction
(May 28, 2003), available online at <http://www.un.org/Depts/oip> (visited Sept 18, 2003).
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operations, and other items, as of December 31, 2002, OIP had received $46.8
billion worth of contracts, of which $39 billion had been approved.5 5
Humanitarian supplies and oil industry equipment worth more than $24.8 billion
dollars had been delivered to Iraq. 56 Over a period of about five years, serving
an Iraqi population of 23 million, the program has delivered roughly $200 worth
of goods per capita per year, including oil spare parts and other goods not
directly consumed by the population. Allowing for domestic production outside
the OFF program and for smuggling, the result still appears to leave Iraqi
citizens an exceedingly low per capita income which may be at or below the $1
per day World Bank threshold of absolute poverty.
Nonetheless, "[a]s of 29 May 2003, some $28 billion worth [of]
humanitarian supplies and equipment had been delivered to Iraq under the Oilfor-Food Programme, including $1.6 billion worth of oil industry spare parts and
equipment. An additional $10 billion worth of supplies were in the production
and delivery pipeline." 57 "Since the first food arrived in March 1997, foodstuffs
worth over $10.7 billion and health supplies worth over $2 billion were delivered
to Iraq. ' 58 There is no question that the program helped to improve the overall
59
socioeconomic conditions of the Iraqi people throughout the country.
Moreover, it Xrevented further degradation of public services and societal
infrastructure. Regarding food, the nutritional value of the monthly food
basket distributed countrywide has nearly doubled since 1996, from about 1,200
to over 2,200 kilocalories per person per day. 6 1 Malnutrition rates in 2002 62in
south-central Iraq are half those of 1996 among children under the age of five.
Despite these improvements, the Oil-for-Food program clearly is not
tantamount to humanitarian aid. No foreign government or non-governmental
organization donates food, clothing, medicine, or other items to Iraq under the
program. The government of Iraq sells oil and then pays in hard currency (from
a UN-controlled "escrow account") for imports which must be approved by the
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UN Office of the Iraq Program-Oil-for-Food, In Brief (cited in note 48).
Id. This $17.2 billion disparity is explained by several factors, including cumbersome
procedures imposed by Security Council rules, poor or obstructionist Iraqi management,
"holds" mostly imposed by the United States, and other factors. These and subsequent data
on trade sanctions are available through the UN Office of the Iraq Programme website
<http://www.un.org/Depts/oip> (visited Oct 5, 2003). See also UN Office of the Iraq
Programme, Week y Update (13-19 Juy 2002), available online at <http://www.un.org/
Depts/oip/background/latest/wu020723.html> (visited Sept 18, 2003).
UN Office of the Iraq Programme-Oil-for-Food, About the Programme:A Fact Sheet (cited in
note 53).
UN Office of the Iraq Programme-Oil-for-Food, In Brief(cited in note 48).
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Security Council Sanctions Committee. Thereafter, the United Nations
distributes the imports in the North and various UN staff oversees Iraqi
government distribution in the Center and South. While the OFF program did
alleviate the economic desperation in the late 1990s for much of Iraq's
population, it did not eliminate the humanitarian crisis.6 3 The OFF program
remains in place even after the US invasion and take-over of Iraq in March-April
2003, but is scheduled to end on November 21, 2003.64
As the sanctions regime against Iraq developed, it underwent a process of
transformation. It evolved from an operation dedicated to closing Iraq's borders
during 1990 to 1997, to an import-export regime that strictly regulated specified
goods bought by Iraq in exchange for at first limited and then unrestricted oil
sales from 1997 through 2000. Between 2000 and 2003, UN sanctions against
Iraq amounted to a regime that sought to ban more items than under the OFF
program, but still tried to tailor the import of other items to sustain the
sanctions operation with only nominal Security Council oversight. OFF will end
in November 2003, long before a new government is formed in Iraq and
demonstrates the capability to govern that country.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE IRAQI SANCTIONS
EXPERIENCE
A. LESSONS OF PURPOSE AND EFFICACY
The UN sanctions against Iraq produced lessons that seriously call into
question both the operation's policy procedure and its legal substance. These
measures were instigated to alter the conduct of Saddam Hussein's regime-to
compel the Iraqi government to give up its weapons of mass destruction. To
accomplish this objective, the Security Council as an international body is dutybound to observe international law. It remains obligated by international legal
rules and its own Charter in imposing sanctions, not the particular foreign policy
interests of any member state. In this respect, the Security Council's justification
for sanctions and the manner in which they functioned were also salient. UN
economic sanctions supposedly provide an interim tactic short of military action
63

The UN Secretariat said as much when it reported in November 2000 to the Security Council
that:
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[T]he humanitarian programme was never intended to meet all the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population or to be a substitute for normal
economic activity. Also, the programme is not geared to address the longerterm deterioration of living standards or to remedy declining educational and
health standards and infrastructure.
United Nations, Report of the Secretagy-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph5 of Resolution 1302, UN Doc
No S/2000/1132 at 5 (2000).
UN Office of the Iraq Programme-Oil-for-Food, Ahout the Programme: Oil-for-Food, available
online at <http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/index.html>
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intended to persuade Iraq to change its behavior. In the case of Iraq, this tactic
did not fully succeed, as weapons of mass destruction or their components were
not found in Iraq after 1998 and the regime was toppled by US military force,
not UN economic coercion.
This suggests a lesson: the ways and means of implementing sanctions are
significant. Such UN measures operate in two dimensions: economic and
political. When the Security Council imposes restrictions on trade-inclusive of
investment-against a target state, such conditions inexorably lead to disruption
of that state's economy. The Security Council justifies such restrictions because,
on the political level, pressures from people impacted in the target state are
presumed to persuade that government to comply with UN demands.
Consequently, economic and political effectiveness stand as dual concepts
inherent in the calculus of economic coercion that distinguishes the analysis of
UN sanctions. The logic of imposing UN sanctions holds that the greater the
economic efficacy of sanctions, the more likely those measures should be
effective politically. Such reasoning implies that the more gravely UN sanctions
disrupt a target state's economy, the greater the likelihood of attaining the
political goals of those sanctions. This critical consideration turns on the extent
of that disruption, which depends on the strength, comprehensive scope, and
enforceability of the boycott-embargo tandem. It is reasonable to infer that the
extent of economic dislocation remains directly relative to the welfare of the
target state's citizens. To be sure, the process of UN sanctions depends on the
inverse correlation between the welfare of a target state's citizens and their
government's willingness to comply politically with the Security Council's
mandate. It follows that the more economic harm done to that state's citizens,
the greater political pressures should be generated by the people against the
government, and the more willing the government should then become to
accept the desired change.
In the case of Iraq, the fallacy of such reasoning prompted serious ethical
concerns. For one, the obvious concern arose about the level of economic
damage inflicted on innocent Iraqi civilians. If the economic damage caused by
the sanctions on the citizenry is extreme, it seems proper to query whether these
actions violate fundamental human rights and international humanitarian law.
The particular calculus of UN economic sanctions posits that systematic
economic pressures against a derelict state remain the primary goal of sanctions.
The fact that such economic pressures are intended to induce citizens to rise up
and instigate political change of their leadership cannot override the pernicious
impacts on innocent persons targeted solely because they live in that state.
Another lesson of the Iraqi sanctions is that a UN sanctions operation
must have some end game. Admittedly, strategic logic demands that it is
imprudent to set a time limit for a UN sanctions operation. To do so would
allow an offending government merely to bide its time until the sanctions expire.
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However, it also seems desirable for a UN sanctions operation to be
implemented with a deliberate, graduated timetable for aclieving its objective.
Further, the lack of a set deadline does not legitimize a sanctions operation in
perpetuity. Indeed, Article 1, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter requires that
measures undertaken to maintain international peace and security (inclusive of
sanctions) must be "effective" and must be "in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law." A review process is needed to assess the threat
and determine the proportionality of a UN sanctions response. Sanctions must
be evaluated to make certain that they are not unjust or that they do not in any
way violate principles of international law. Likewise, sanctions must be
constantly reviewed to ascertain whether or not they are effective in maintaining
peace and security. Ineffective or unjust sanctions or those that violate other
norms of international law may not be imposed, or must be lifted if they have
been imposed. In this regard, efforts by the Security Council to assess the
economic efficacy of sanctions against Iraq faltered, while obtaining any kind of
threat assessment was undercut by the absence of weapons inspectors between
1998 and late 2002. In sum, lawful sanctions may become illegal if applied for
too long without achieving meaningful results. Similarly, protracted sanctions
can produce grave impacts that injure innocent persons and society long after
the illicit government ends, and excessively prolonged sanctions may come to be
viewed as ineffective.
The possibility that sanctions can be terminated if certain conditions are
fulfilled must be plainly specified. The Security Council should make clear the
conditions for lifting sanctions against a state and, in the same instance, assure
an offending government that sanctions will be lifted when it complies with the
conditions and policies articulated in the sanctions resolution. If such a
communication is not made, UN sanctions can become instruments for punitive
retribution, as opposed to tools for policy persuasion. For Iraq, the Security
Council in 1999 did propose to "suspend" its sanctions once independent
verification had been performed. Suspension never happened, nor was an
65
independent verification scheme ever adopted, much less implemented.
A final practical lesson of the Iraqi sanctions is that politics matter. If
sanctions are to attain legal and ethical solvency, they must not appear to
endorse double standards. Double standards produce perceptions of political
bias and hypocrisy. The application of UN sanctions against one offending
government and not on another like offender-particularly within the same
geographical area-can undercut the legitimacy that supports the international
authority of UN sanctions generally. In so doing, respect for the role of the
United Nations in striving to maintain international peace and security will be
diluted. In the case of Iraq, destruction of its chemical, biological, and nuclear
65

See Security Council Res No 1284, UN Doc No S/RES/1284 (1999).

Fall2003

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

weapons capability was tied to the objective of making the Middle East free
from states with weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile capability.
That ambition is unquestionably laudable; it is just as reasonable, however, to
take seriously the assertions by Iraq and other Arab states that they must possess
such unconventional weapons as military deterrents against Israel, who is known
to possess nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. There is understandable
method to the madness behind this deterrence logic.
B. HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS
The sanctions situation in Iraq produced serious lessons for human rights
considerations as well. First and foremost, the Security Council is not above the
law. UN sanctions are bound by norm-oriented objectives contained in the
Charter and are not a means for the Security Council to express political
disagreement with some state's foreign policy conduct. UN sanctions are limited
to altering the behavior of a member state, not for promoting regime change as
their explicit objective. Both the Security Council and the sanctions that it
authorizes are duty-bound by international legal rules and principles created by
the UN. Foremost among these legal rules are those that pertain to human
rights.
The UN Charter specifically obligates the Security Council to respect
human rights in all its actions. The purpose of the United Nations in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights as articulated in Article 1, paragraph 3,
inevitably restricts sanctions. This provision also mandates that the UN should
ameliorate urgent humanitarian situations, not cause them. Sanctions, therefore,
must not produce unwarranted deprivations for the people of a country.
Sanctions that even indirectly cause deaths would be a violation of the right to
life. Other human rights could also be violated by sanctions regimes, such as the
rights to security of the person, health, education, or employment. In addition,
Article 55 of the Charter reinforces the limitations of Article 1, paragraph 3, in
that it requires that the United Nations promote higher standards of living and
economic and social progress (paragraph a); provide for solutions to
international economic, social, health, and other problems (paragraph b); and
generate respect for and observance of human rights (paragraph c). Sanctions
regimes that depress economic conditions, create public health crises or impinge
on human rights would violate this critical UN protective provision. Similarly,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides
for the right to an adequate standard of living (Article 11), the right to health
(Article 12), and the right to education (Article 13). 66 The right to life is
protected in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
66
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and its Article 4 asserts the important additional concept of the non-derogability
of basic rights. 67 As the sanctions case of Iraq dramatically demonstrated, the
plight of children during periods of economic deprivation is especially grave and
vulnerable. Accordingly, human rights law has been constructed to grant
children special protections in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This
convention expressly asserts in Article 6 that "every child has the inherent right
to life" and directs all states to "ensure to the maximum extent possible the
survival and development of the child." In Article 24, the Convention further
directs states to "recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness
and
68
rehabilitation of health" and "[t]o diminish infant and child mortality."
In light of these obligations, the UN sanctions imposed against Iraq
prompt stark concerns about the lawfulness of their impact on innocent Iraqi
civilians. The Security Council is indisputably accountable for principles of
human rights, irrespective of Saddam Hussein's regime. It is uniformly accepted
that governments make international legal rules to limit and condemn the
predictable suffering and death of innocent persons. When UN economic
sanctions are considered necessary to prevent greater suffering and death, those
sanctions must still be limited by human rights law and humanitarian law, which
both forbid the targeting of innocent persons. In this regard, it is well known
that human rights are based on the inherent dignity and worth of every human
being and are owed directly to individuals.
The human rights of civilians are not forfeited because of a government's
misconduct, especially when the citizens have no voice in the decisions of that
government. The conclusion is clear: Iraq's failure to comply with Security
Council resolutions cannot give that body license to impose sanctions that
abrogate its obligations to respect the human rights of Iraqi civilians. Thus, UN
sanctions must respect certain mandates in the Charter, including the following:
they must abide by international legal strictures and respect human rights; they
must reflect an unambiguously stated purpose, namely to restore international
67
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Res No 2200A
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peace and security, not to punish a people for the malfeasance of their
government. They must be policy-oriented and not aimed at individual persons
in a government, and they should be regarded as a policy tool for righting legal
wrongs, not a preemptive instrument for punishing a wrongdoer.
C. HUMANITARIAN LAW CONCERNS
The UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to respond to threats to
international peace and security. When it does so, however, the Council often
functions in a murky zone between war and peace. UN sanctions fall into this
murky zone. Such a situation prompts the question of whether the Security
Council is governed by either the legal regime of humanitarian law during times
of armed conflict or that of human rights law during times of peace. While both
legal regimes are rooted in humanitarian norms, they offer varied degrees of
protection to the individual. The regime for human rights, as mentioned before,
allocates strict protection to civilian life, health, and property. In the case of
humanitarian law, as witnessed during the 2003 war with Iraq, the laws of armed
conflict permit belligerent parties to inflict collateral damage and civilian
casualties when attacking legitimate military targets, provided that three
conditions are met: (1) the harm to civilians may not be disproportionate to the
worth of the military target; (2) the damage and death must be unavoidable; and
(3) all efforts must be made to diminish the possibility of civilian deaths. In these
regards, a number of lessons for future UN sanctions operations are notable.
First, a sanctions regime imposed during an armed conflict is governed by
humanitarian law. Under the corpus of humanitarian law, the civilian population
must be protected from war and its consequences as much as possible. This
requires that the civilian population must be provided with or be permitted to
obtain, the essentials for survival, namely food, potable water, shelter, medicines
and medical care. A number of international legal instruments specifically codify
these provisions. For example, the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land of 1907 contain provisions that could substantially
limit sanctions regimes. 69 In addition, the Martens Clause mandates that all
situations arising from war are to be governed by principles of law of civilized
70
nations, principles of humanity, and the "dictates of the public conscience."
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See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907), 36
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Stat 2277 (hereinafter Hague Convention IV).
Id at preamble 8. This principle was reiterated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Additional Protocol 1 thereto. See Geneva Convention () for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art 63 (1949), 6 UST 3114;
Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art 63 (1949), 6 UST 3220; Geneva
Convention (111) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art 142 (1949), 6 UST 3316;
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art
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Article 50 of the Hague Convention pointedly provides that, "No general
penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be -inflicted upon the population on
account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly
and severally responsible." 7 1 Similarly, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
contain provisions relevant to the imposition of sanctions. For example, they
mandate the free passage of medical provisions and objects necessary for
religious worship. These instruments also articulate rules relating to medical
convoys and evacuation,7 3 which could be breached by a sanctions regime that
restricted land or air transport of humanitarian goods. Since the main intent of
the Geneva Conventions is to provide for the medical needs of military
personnel wounded in armed conflict, a sanctions regime that limits the ability of
a targeted state to provide for its wounded could be construed as unlawful. As
the four agreements explicitly assert, Geneva Convention rights may not be
abrogated or waived in any circumstance.
A second general humanitarian legal concern turns on whether the citizens
injured are civilians or military personnel, and whether these people should be
held responsible for their government's actions. This issue casts an intriguing
dilemma, since international legal rules hold that in times of armed conflict,
innocent persons should be protected from the consequences of crimes
committed by others. 74 A fundamental principle permeating each of the four
1949 Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War sets limitations on what can be
legitimate targets during armed conflict. This principle, called the principle of
discrimination, demands that the belligerent parties distinguish between
combatants and noncombatants and between wounded and non-wounded
combatants. The 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Conventions prohibits belligerents
from targeting the civilian infrastructure. 75 One might logically conclude that
actions prohibited in armed conflict ought to be prohibited during peacetime as
well, even if legitimized by the UN employing the nonviolent tool of economic
sanctions.
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158 (1949), 6 UST 3516 (hereinafter Geneva Convention IV); Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts art 1(2) (1977), 1125 UN Treaty Ser 7 (hereinafter Protocol I).
Hague Convention IV art 50 (cited in note 69).
Geneva Convention IV art 23 (cited in note 70).
Geneva Convention IV arts 21-22 (cited in note 70).
See generally Geneva Convention IV (cited at note 70).
As provided for in Protocol I,
(1)
(2)

Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as
foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops,
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works .
. for any... motive.
Protocol I art 54 (cited in note 70).
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It bears remembering that Article 39 of the Charter permits the Security
Council to take measures such as sanctions to "maintain or restore international
peace and security" only upon its determination that there exists a threat to or
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. Sanctions, therefore, may only be
imposed upon a government or other political unit that is capable of being a
threat to international peace or security, or is in fact threatening international
peace and security. While armed groups within a state may pose such a threat, a
generally unarmed civilian population is unlikely of being capable of posing such
a threat.
The implication of this is clear. A sensible code of accountability posits
that responsibility for suffering caused by economic sanctions lies with those
governments who instigate and enforce them, not their general populations. As
Iraq indicates, UN sanctions are neither inevitable nor automatic economic
actions. Such measures are decided intentionally, premeditatedly, and purposely,
and are motivated by the ambition to compel a government to make amends for
violations of international norms or legal rules. Government leaders who breach
international legal rules may invite the application of UN sanctions, but that
action is not synonymous with their bringing sanctions upon themselves. UN
sanctions permeate and impact the entire fabric of a state's society, not merely
the political elites that commit the wrong. The reality of that point must not be
lost in the process of devising and designing the sanctions regime.
A third lesson suggests that, since UN sanctions are instruments of
international politics, the imposing governments are obligated to make them
conform to the principle of equality of application under customary international
law. This principle is indispensable for legitimizing a policy articulated by the
United Nations. Indeed, the credibility of the UN rests on the uniform
application of procedures for comparable situations in international relations.
Such an egalitarian principle admittedly was difficult during the Cold War, and it
remains difficult today. Even so, the Security Council's application of sanctions
measures, particularly against Iraq, appeared all too often politically motivated,
as opposed to morally inspired. A raft of evil and corrupt governments exists in
the world today, yet the UN Security Council selects only a few as targets for
economic sanctions. Why? While the answer may come down to the protection
of certain norms or politics of the moment, the more likely answer hinges on
political goals sought by certain members, especially the major powers, on the
Security Council.
A final lesson is that participants in sanctions coalitions must be able to
withstand economic incentives and temptations from the target state to cheat. In
the case of Iraq, Saddam's government successfully offered economic incentives
to some states, including its neighbors, to violate the embargo. Clearly the
national interests of various governments favored cheating over upholding the
sanctions. France, China, and Russia were large creditor states to Iraq, and each
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was promised huge oil industry and armaments deals; and Iraq's neighborsespecially Syria and Jordan-frequendy obtained cheap Iraqi oil in exchange for
black market trade of goods with Iraq.76 One key to strengthening sanctions
against Iraq therefore lay in tightening financial control over Iraq's revenues and
compensating those states that suffered losses from sanctions against Iraq under
Article 50 of the UN Charter, which provides:
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the
Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations
or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising
from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the
Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.
In addition, the category of sanctions (that is, economic embargoes, freezing
assets, or travel restrictions) must be proportional to the threat posed by the
target state to international peace and security. The obligation of proportionality
does not accrue from the indeterminate standing of economic sanctions as a
means of coercion. Instead, proportionality of response is tied to the nature of
international humanitarian law. Given this requirement, there is a genuine
necessity to reevaluate at regular intervals the extent and gravity of societal
impacts a UN sanctions operation has over time against a target state.
V. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the Cold War, economic sanctions are increasingly being
used by the United Nations as nonviolent instruments for handling international
disputes. Yet, despite their nonviolent intent, UN economic sanctions, if applied
and enforced effectively, can cause pervasive public suffering in a target state,
propelled by the aim of pressuring that government into conceding and halting
its objectionable policies. For nearly thirteen years, UN economic sanctions
against Iraq lethally impacted Iraq's domestic society, yet they were politically
unsuccessful in achieving their intended policy objectives. Indeed, as reported,
the economic deprivation and societal suffering in Iraq were so extensive that
charges alleging massive violations of the human rights of tens of thousands of
innocent persons may well be accurate.
UN sanctions involve economic compulsion. More than that, however,
sanctions constitute a coercive tool of international politics that strives to
achieve what diplomatic suasion, pressure, or other political incentives have
failed to do. UN sanctions have been imposed when states violate the territorial
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integrity of other states, when governments perpetrate severe human rights
violations within their own territory, when governments violate international
conventions, or when a state poses a threat to international peace and security.
UN multilateral sanctions are usually justified on the grounds that they work to
redress violations of international law or massive human rights abuses. As
indicated by the case of Iraq, UN sanctions can be problematic, both in principle
and in practice.
The Security Council entered into a decision to impose sanctions on Iraq
without serious consideration of the need to protect the fundamental human
rights of innocent Iraq civilians. Multilateral sanctions imposed by the Security
Council benefit from a presumption of legitimacy drawn from an explicit grant
of pow&r in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, the Security Council risks
violating its own Charter and international customary and human rights law if it
fails to gauge the extent and duration of sanctions with the same sensitivity it
would apply to the decision to use armed force. When that failure occurs, the
legitimacy of those UN sanctions is undercut and the authority of the United
Nations is compromised.
The case of Iraq demonstrates how and why UN economic sanctions
might not measure up as a humane alternative to the used of armed force. More
than that, UN sanctions on Iraq highlight the need to reiterate and plainly
demarcate what legal rules constrain actions of the Security Council. It is
obvious that the Council's salient power to act in international relations must be
circumscribed by accepted principles of international law. For nearly thirteen
years, the Security Council maintained comprehensive sanctions against Iraq
absent any reference to its legal obligations under principles of human rights and
humanitarian law. It is remarkable that, even with as many as 400,000 innocent
Iraqi citizens dying, nearly the entire international community remained silent on
the critical issue regarding the lawfulness of Security Council sanctions against
Iraq. This realization highlights the need for the Security Council, and
particularly the major powers, to rethink the ways and means of applying
sanctions against a government. Comprehensive sanctions may be well intended,
but they can generate uncontrolled impacts against certain sectors within a state,
especially the poor, the sick, the old, and the young. The evidence does not
support the proposition that such sweeping sanctions will produce greater
effectiveness in bringing about changes in the behavior of the government of
that state, which ultimately remains the principal target for policy change.
This prompts a final point about the effectiveness of sanctions. As the Iraq
case once again makes clear, the economic coercion generated by the Security
Council's sanctions can only be as strong as UN member states are willing to make
it. This truism mirrors the essence of how the United Nations can be effective as
an international enforcer of legal rules. States must cooperate closely to make UN
sanctions decisions work well. The key, therefore, to making UN sanctions
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effective is political will. The major powers on the Security Council in particular,
but all states in general, must exercise sufficient political will, national
determination, and, sometimes, economic sacrifice to make multilateral sanctions
work. Otherwise, the sanctions imposed by the United Nations against a
transgressor government will remain more symbol than substance and contribute
little toward the attainment of anything approaching an international order
governed by the rule of law.
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